

TUESDAY MORNING, 16 OCTOBER 1984

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**New stealth fighter deal alleged**

Los Angeles Times News Service

BURBANK, Calif. — Lockheed Corp., which last week reported a 49 percent surge in quarterly profits, has significantly expanded its top-secret Air Force stealth fighter program, according to recent assessments by security analysts.

A lengthy research report just issued by the Wall Street brokerage firm Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Inc. states that the Lockheed stealth fighter has entered production and will generate revenues of \$850 million this year. By 1988, Lockheed would derive revenues of \$1.4 billion and profits of \$130 million from the program, according to the report.

Written by aerospace analyst David J. Smith, the Bernstein report offers the most detailed projections to date on the stealth fighter, so called because it would be designed to elude detection by radar and infrared sensors.

The Lockheed stealth fighter is not to be confused with the stealth bomber, which is being developed by Northrop Corp. The stealth fighter has an even lower public profile than the stealth bomber.

Smith is not alone among analysts who believe that Burbank-based Lockheed, which historically has been the leading supplier of the Air Force's top-secret aircraft, is in the midst of a dramatic aircraft production buildup.

"I think it is going to be a very large program," says analyst Harinder Kohli of San Francisco-based Sutro & Co. Inc. "This is the most classified work Lockheed has, and they don't talk about it. It's all guesswork, but we are talking about a \$10 billion to \$15 billion program."

Lockheed's aircraft business, as opposed to its space or shipbuilding units, is the company's "most important profit center," Smith says. The Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Group will pace the parent corporation's growth with a 9.7 percent annual growth rate between 1983 and 1988, he forecasts.

The speculation about the Lockheed stealth is based on a wide range of evidence that the Air Force is funding a major, super-secret fighter aircraft program and that Lockheed has substantial revenues and employment in aircraft production that cannot be explained by its acknowledged programs.

For example, the Lockheed California Co., the unit of the company that produces such warplanes, has 17,300 employees, including 2,400 in Palmdale, Calif., and 14,428 in Burbank. Only several thousand of those Burbank employees can be explained by unclassified programs.

In an interview last year, Ben Rich, former chief of the Lockheed Skunk Works, said that Lockheed has produced secret operational aircraft for the Air Force since President Johnson disclosed the existence of the Lockheed SR-71 in the mid-1960s. The Skunk Works is Lockheed's secret aircraft development unit.

In addition, Burbank residents have told of strange late-night goings-on at the Burbank Airport where Lockheed facilities are located. A huge C-5 cargo aircraft reportedly visits the facilities late at night and either delivers or picks up secret cargo. Residents of Burbank and the San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles have complained about the jet noise.

It is thought to be unlikely that Lockheed or the Air

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**U.S. Sends Official to Angola; Shultz Tells of 'Some Motion'**

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

TORONTO, Oct. 15 — The United States has sent a high-ranking official to Angola for talks with Angolan leaders on the prospects of resolving pending southern African questions and on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the State Department said today.

Flying here for a meeting with Canadian officials, Secretary of State George P. Shultz said that "there certainly is some motion" toward breaking the long deadlock in southern Africa, but he cautioned that "we don't believe it is wise to say there is any major development until you've got that development."

Frank G. Wisner, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who has met several times in the last two years with Angolan officials, arrived in Luanda, the Angolan capital, to discuss the Angolan response to proposals in August by Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the department said in Washington.

President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola has said in recent interviews that his Government was discussing initiatives with the United States on ways to end the impasse in southern Africa.

**The 2 Sides of the Dispute**

The Angolans are pressing for a total withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola and agreement on South Africa's withdrawal from Southwest Africa, known as Namibia, and turning the country over to United Nations supervision for an interim period.

The South Africans, who have pulled their troops to within 25 miles of the An-

gola-Namibia border, have balked at going farther until there is a timetable for the withdrawal of what are estimated to be 25,000 Cuban combat troops in Angola.

United States proposals have sought to arrange for the Cubans to withdraw and Namibia to become independent at roughly the same time. The United States, aware of Angola's refusal to link the two actions directly, has avoided calling for simultaneous action but is working on a phased plan, American officials have said.

John Hughes, the State Department spokesman, speaking at a briefing in Washington before accompanying Mr. Shultz here, disclosed the Wisner mission. He said, "We're engaged in what we consider to be serious talks in Angola."

**Breakthrough at Any Time**

"We're encouraged by President dos Santos' reiteration that the principle of Cuban troops withdrawal in the context of an overall settlement is accepted," he said.

Mr. Shultz, aboard his Air Force plane, said progress on the African issue was perceptible but slow. He said a breakthrough could occur at any time but he was not going to predict when.

His talks later today and on Tuesday with Joe Clark, the Minister for External Affairs in the new Progressive Conservative Government, will cover international and Canadian-American issues. This is a routine semiannual meeting by the two sides.

Force would fly a stealth fighter out of the Burbank Airport. Rather, the craft would be crated and shipped to a secret airfield, such as the top-secret fields located at the Nevada Test Site.

Air Force and Lockheed officials decline to make any comments about any aspect of the stealth reports. However, Lockheed Chairman Roy A. Anderson noted for the first time at the company's annual meeting earlier this year that the company won "a major classified program" in the last year.

Bernstein analyst Smith believes that program is the stealth fighter production contract. Smith, a former Air Force test pilot, estimates that the Air Force will buy 300 to 400 of the aircraft over the next decade, with deliveries beginning in 1986 or 1987.

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**Pentagon***Many Are Chosen, but Few Get to Wear Stars*

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 15 — For two hot months this summer, one Army general, four lieutenant generals and 16 major generals sat in a cramped, darkened room at the Military Personnel Center near the Pentagon poring over the records of 2,800 colonels.

At issue was the selection of 64 new brigadier generals. In the military service, the leap from colonel in the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force to brigadier general, or from captain to commodore in the Navy, is by far the most competitive of all promotions.

Moreover, when colonels or captains take off eagles and put on stars, their lives change. They assume immensely more authority and are held to higher standards of responsibility; their careers and status soar.

Thus the careful screening in that room, where the lights were dimmed while the microfilmed records were being studied. Each of the generals, sleeves rolled up, some smoking, read through every colonel's file of 40 or more efficiency reports, annual health records and letters of commendation or criticism.

Each general then graded each colonel on a scale of 6 to 1. A 6 meant the colonel "absolutely" should be promoted, while 5 was for those "clearly above contemporaries" and 4 meant a "solid performer." A 3 meant basically qualified, while a 2 meant the colonel had "too many weaknesses," and a 1 meant the colonel should "absolutely not" be promoted.

The ratings were fed into a computer to establish an order of merit. Then the generals sat around a table to argue. Selecting the top half of the colonels for promotion was easy; it was the bottom half that was scrutinized in agonizing detail.

That done, copies of a tentative list were given to the Criminal Investigation Command, which made sure none of the nominees were facing charges in a civilian court, and to the Army's Inspector General, which checked Army files for adverse reports.

Said an officer familiar with the process, "You don't want to pick as a potential division commander some guy who's up on porno charges before a civilian court."

Finally, after the approval of the Chief of Staff, Gen. John A. Wickham Jr., and the Secretary of the Army,

John O. Marsh Jr., the list of colonels to be promoted was submitted by President Reagan to the Senate on Oct. 1. Three days later the Senate approved the list.

**The Oldest and the Youngest**

The oldest to be promoted this year is Col. Marvin G. O'Connell, who is 52 years old, has served for 29 years and is chief of staff at the National Defense University in Washington, the top educational institution in the military service.

The youngest, Col. Jerry C. Harrison, who will be 43 next month, has served for 21 years and commands the artillery in the Second Infantry Division in South Korea. Col. Rudolph Ostovich 3d, who is a month older, has also served for 21 years and commands the 11th Aviation Group in West Germany.

Closer to the median is Col. Henry M. Hagwood Jr., who will turn 47 later this month and has served for 24 years, the average length of service for this crop of brigadier generals. He

commands the Field Artillery Training Center at Fort Sill in Oklahoma.

The weeding out of officers as they near the top is ruthless. In the Army today, an officer who has a normal career reaches lieutenant colonel within 20 years. At last count the Army had 10,707 lieutenant colonels, but only 4,700 of them will be promoted to colonel to serve for five more years.

After that, a mere 200 colonels will ever make it to brigadier general. Once having reached brigadier general, however, about 140 will eventually become major generals. Beyond that, only a few will be selected for three- or four-star general.

The process this year began when General Wickham named a selection board of generals led by Robert W. Sennewald, Commanding General of Army forces within the United States.

General Wickham gave General Sennewald a letter of instruction specifying the number of brigadier generals to be selected and for which branch, such as infantry, field artillery or military police, or for which specialty, such as personnel, logistics or public affairs.

On July 17 the board began screening records, with particular attention to the efficiency reports made each year or whenever an officer or his superior changed assignments. "One

bad efficiency report is not going to affect you," said a knowledgeable officer. "But three or four..."

Army officers say weight is often given to the difficulty of a colonel's assignments throughout his career. A colonel who has taken on tough jobs, such as division chief of staff, will more likely be given higher ratings than a colonel who stayed behind a desk.

The board also pays close attention to photographs of the colonels, to see whether appearance fits with physical records. "Looks have something to do with it," one officer said. Another scoffed, "Sometimes they just pick pretty boys."

Less important is what is known as "loose paper," which includes decorations and commendations. A colonel may write to the board, but that letter is usually confined to drawing a late piece of information to the board's attention. It is considered bad form to blow one's own horn, and letters of recommendation or phone calls to the board are not permitted.

**Scorecards Are Coded**

The scorecard on each colonel is coded so no general on the board will know the ratings given by the other generals. So long as each general is consistent, the system is considered fair. Few 6's are given and a 1 requires the rater to give an reason.

Once an order of merit among the colonels comes out of the computer, putting three dozen top colonels into brigadier general slots is swift. If the instructions call for 13 field artillery brigadier generals, the first six or seven are taken right off the list.

Then the horse-trading begins. The generals who are personally acquainted with a particular colonel argue for or against him. A colonel in armor who may be down the list as a tanker but who has experience in a specialty such as personnel management that needs a general may get the nod. Sometimes votes are taken, with the decision going to the Chief of Staff if the board is evenly split.

After the Senate has approved the promotions, the Army begins to assign the colonels to positions calling for brigadier generals. But some get caught in the Army's complex budget proceedings. These new generals will be "frocked," putting on their stars and having the authority of a brigadier general but not getting paid for it until the Army has enough money.

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